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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 08-1394 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM D. EDGAR, 
 
                         Appellant 
_____________ 
    
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-07-cr-00154-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2011 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 13, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Pursuant to the terms of a written plea agreement, William D. Edgar waived 
his right to an indictment and pleaded guilty to a three-count information in the 
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United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The 
information charged Edgar with a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, wire 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1344.  The charges were based on Edgar’s participation in a scheme to defraud 
federally insured financial institutions by submitting materially false statements in 
mortgage loan applications.  The plea agreement contained a broad waiver of 
Edgar’s right to appeal his conviction or sentence.  In addition, the agreement set 
forth stipulations by the parties regarding the calculation of Edgar’s offense level 
based on the amount of the loss, his role in the offense, and his acceptance of 
responsibility.  At sentencing, after noting the applicable stipulations, the District 
Court determined that Edgar’s offense level was 21 and that his criminal history 
score was I, yielding a sentencing guidelines range of 37 to 46 months.  At the 
conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the District Court  imposed, inter alia, 
concurrent sentences of 37 months of imprisonment on each count.   
Edgar appealed.1
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 
   He contends that the District Court abused its discretion 
because it failed to adequately consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and to grant a downward variance.  In a second argument Edgar 
asserts that the Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a  downward 
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departure or variance on the basis that the stipulated amount of loss overstated the 
actual loss.  The government invokes the appellate waiver contained in the plea 
agreement and submits that it should be enforced.  In the alternative, the 
government asserts that Edgar’s arguments lack merit. 
The issues that Edgar raises on appeal fall within the scope of the appellate 
waiver.  Because Edgar acknowledges that his appellate waiver was knowing and 
voluntary, we consider “whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.”  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008).  Edgar 
acknowledges that his sentencing guideline was correctly calculated and that his 
sentence is within the guideline range.  Nonetheless, he contends that the waiver 
should be set aside because the District Court’s failure to give any meaningful 
consideration to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors constitutes a miscarriage of 
justice.  According to Edgar, the Court merely listed the § 3553(a) factors and did 
not explain the weight it accorded the evidence Edgar adduced to mitigate his 
sentence.   
In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), we declined to 
invalidate appeal waivers based on any particular legal or factual claim, choosing 
instead to consider several factors in deciding whether to vacate an otherwise valid 
waiver.  Id. at 563 (endorsing the approach in United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 
25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)).  Central to this inquiry is whether the District Court erred.  
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We find no error.  It is clear from a review of the record before us that the District 
Court did more than simply list the factors.  It specifically noted the circumstances 
Edgar cited in support of a downward variance.  It chose, however, after noting, 
inter alia, the ongoing nature of the offenses, the elaborate scheme used to defraud 
the mortgage brokers, the significant loss Edgar caused to several institutions, and 
the seriousness of the offenses, to impose a sentence at the bottom of the 
sentencing guidelines.  Accordingly, we conclude that there is no basis for setting 
aside the valid appellate waiver and we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.2
                                                 
2   Inasmuch as we have concluded that the appellate waiver is valid and effective, we do 
not reach Edgar’s arguments on the merits.  For that reason, we deny as moot defense 
counsel’s motion to file a supplemental reply brief citing new authority to address one of 
Edgar’s substantive arguments.  We also deny Edgar’s pro se motions to proceed pro se 
and to amend the appellate brief in order to raise the same authority.   
  
 
